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A B S T R A C T 
 
The Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) concept is mainly based on Coasean economics 
theory that emphasizes the creation of a voluntary or market-based transaction for ecosystem 
services. Alternatively, many PES practiced in developing countries are based on Pigouvian 
economic theory allowing government intervention such as through regulation, tax or 
subsidy. A hybrid PES approach that compound Coasean and Pigouvian theory was 
developed in West Lombok Indonesia leading to a new policy paradigm that combines 
elements of both a voluntary market-based and mandatory policy-based system. This study 
aims to assess how the hybrid PES program contributes to poverty alleviation. By employing 
a participatory econometrics approach, this study found that the hybrid PES system does not 
contribute to poverty alleviation in short-term. It is possible that this PES program contributes 
to poverty alleviation in long-term. 
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1. Introduction 
Natural resources use frequently creates both positive and negative externalities that 
affect people differentially. Externalities are defined as external benefits or costs to some 
people that emerge as a result of others’ activity (van den Bergh, 2010). Externalities can be 
positive if they come as benefits and can be negative if they come as costs for the affected 
parties. A simple example of a positive externality is that people can enjoy free clean and 
fresh air as a result of trees planted by other land-owners. On the other hand, unpleasant air as 
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a consequence of the existence of a nearby chicken farm could be an example of a negative 
externality. Positive externalities are not likely to be the subject of contestation since the 
affected parties benefit from their existence. By contrast, negative externalities are often an 
issue of interest since their existence is likely to raise problems for those that are affected, 
and may ultimately result in disregard or damage to the natural resource itself.  
To promote natural resources sustainability by reducing negative externalities, a 
relatively new paradigm has been developed into a new policy instrument, namely Payment 
for Ecosystem Services (PES). Ecosystem services can be defined as the tangible and 
intangible ecological components, the benefits of which are enjoyed by people directly or 
indirectly (Costanza et al., 1997; MA, 2003; Boyd & Banzhaf, 2007; Fisher et al., 2009). 
Examples of ecosystem services include carbon sequestration, biodiversity conservation, 
watershed protection, and landscape beauty (Ferraro, 2001; Wunder, 2005). These are 
commonly categorized as public goods or quasi-public goods and typically are free to 
consume. However, the emerging scarcity of these resources causes them to become 
economic goods with the requirement to be managed and potential to be commercialized 
(Wunder, 2005).  
In mainstream PES literature, PES is defined as a transaction based on mutual 
principles of buying and selling where a well-defined ecosystem service is bought by service 
beneficiaries from service providers with a condition that the providers continue to conserve 
the resource in order to secure the service provision (Wunder, 2005; Pagiola, 2007; Wunder, 
2007; Sommerville et al., 2009). PES is often implemented as a program to support natural 
resources restoration and conservation. As Muradian et al. (2010, p. 1205) argue, “PES aims 
to create incentives to align individual and/or collective land use decisions with the social 
interest in the management of natural resources”.  
The terms ecosystem services and environmental services are often used 
interchangeably in academic and public policy literatures (Muradian et al., 2010) although 
there is inconsistency among scientists in the use of these terms (Derissen & Latacz-
Lohmann, 2013). The term ecosystem services is used in this paper since it is the most 
commonly used in literatures because the definition of environmental services tends to be 
more ambiguous (Derissen & Latacz-Lohmann, 2013).   
The concept of ecosystem services can be traced back to 1864 when Marsh wrote 
about the significant role of nature in human life (Marsh, 1864). More than a century later, 
concern about the unregulated use of ecosystem services continues to raise scholars’ 
attention. For instance, in the late 1960s King et al. (as cited in Gómez-Baggethun et al. 
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(2010)) published on the functions of nature in serving human needs.  Throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s, scholars focused on people’s dependence on the environment and the concomitant 
economic impacts, thus raising greater public interest in environmental protection and 
biodiversity conservation (Westman, 1977; Pimentel et al., 1980; Ehrlich & Ehrilch, 1981; 
Costanza et al., 1997). A paper presented by Costanza et al. in 1997 was a landmark in the 
development of the concept and awareness of ecosystem services. The concept of ecosystem 
services started to be employed in the policy arena in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Gómez-
Baggethun et al., 2010).  
 Pagiola (2008) points out that Costa Rica’s country-wide program, called Pago por 
Servicios Ambientales (PSA), in 1997 was the first full-scale implementation of the formal 
PES mechanism in a developing country. The PSA was developed to address the problem of 
deforestation when Costa Rica had become widely known as having one of the highest 
deforestation rates at the time1. As the best-known PES example (Pattanayak & Wunder, 
2010), Costa Rica’s PSA program succeeded in raising the interest of many countries in 
introducing PES programs as a tool for ecosystem protection including Brazil, Mexico, 
Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador, China, and Indonesia. Further impetus came when the Kyoto 
Protocol established the Reducing Emission from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
(REDD) program as a possible vehicle to articulate international PES schemes in the forestry 
sector.  
Currently, there are four major types of ecosystem protection schemes operating 
globally using PES approaches (Wunder et al., 2008; 2011; Greiner et al., 2009; Engel and 
Palmer, 2008):  
1. Carbon sequestration and storage (e.g. an electricity company pays farmers or 
landowners for planting and maintaining additional trees). The REDD program is 
another example of this PES type which aims to compensate the effort of land 
owners in reducing carbon emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
(van Wilgen et al., 1998; Agrawal et al., 2011; Venter & Koh, 2012);  
2. Biodiversity protection (e.g. conservation donors paying local people for restoring 
areas to create a biological corridor); 
3. Watershed protection (e.g. downstream water consumers paying upstream forest 
users for adopting land management that controls deforestation, soil erosion, 
flooding risk, etc.);  
                                                            
1 Costa Rica’s deforestation rate between 1973 and 1989 had an average logging rate of 32,000 hectares/year 
(Brown & Bird, 2010). 
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4. Landscape amenity (e.g. a tourism operator pays a local community for 
maintaining landscape beauty or not hunting in a forest being used for 
ecotourism). 
 
The PES schemes that have been introduced world-wide often employ voluntary market- 
based PES (Pagiola, 2008; Wunder & Albán, 2008; Zhang et al., 2008; Greiner et al., 2009; 
Prasetyo et al., 2009; Clements et al., 2010; Matthew et al., 2010; Pereira, 2010; Milne & 
Adams, 2012).  Most of the buyers come from the private sector, and the sellers are farmers 
located in the areas where the ecosystem services are sourced. Both parties contract to make 
voluntary transactions of certain ecosystem services (mostly related to water quantity and 
quality).  
Since high levels of poverty are often spatially correlated with remote conservation 
areas that provide environmental services (Pagiola et al., 2005), it is argued that PES can be 
used as a tool for poverty alleviation (Duncan, 2006; Pagiola, 2007; Wunder & Albán, 2008). 
However, the reality of the impact of PES programs on the livelihoods of poor households is 
an empirical question. Muradian et al. (2010) argue that the poverty alleviation goals of PES 
programs are hard to be achieved in some cases due to the misdistribution of PES benefits 
that should go to the poor. They stressed that benefits were often disproportionally distributed 
to the well-off landowners who hold formal land tenure. Similarly, Pagiola et al. (2005) 
contend that PES has primarily been an instrument for maintaining natural resource 
efficiency and not for poverty alleviation. They argue that “PES programs are not a magic 
bullet for poverty reduction, but there can be important synergies when program design is 
well thought out and local conditions are favorable” (Pagiola et al., 2005, p. 248). How 
effective of a PES program in improving the community members’ livelihoods, and hence 
alleviating poverty in rural areas that supply environmental services is an open question that 
this study intends to address.  
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
methodology used in the study. Section 3 discusses the concept of Coasean and Pigouvian 
approach on PES programs, PES program introduction in West Lombok including how the 
program integrated into a community forest practice, the payment system and the role of 
intermediary. The results of this study including qualitative survey result and econometrics 





This study was conducted in Sesaot Community Forest in West Lombok, Indonesia. 
This forest is important for water supply to the most area of Lombok Island. Households and 
industries in two districts --Mataram City and West Lombok-- use water from this forest for 
their daily needs. The Sesaot forest also supplies water for agricultural land in these districts 
as well as to two other districts, Central Lombok and East Lombok. The Sesaot forest is a 
pilot for a community forest management scheme in Lombok, where the PES program has 
also been introduced (see figure 1). 
 
 
                     Figure 1. Map of Lombok Island (Lemhanas, 2013) 
 
A mixed research method was used in this study. Mix method is able to minimize the 
weakness of solely quantitative and qualitative methods (Rao & Woolcock, 2003; Creswell & 
Plano-Clark, 2006). Integrated quantitative and qualitative method provides more 
comprehensive evaluation and evidence for a development program such as the PES (Rao & 
Woolcock, 2003; Creswell & Plano-Clark, 2006). Following Rao and Woolcock (2003), the 
mixed method approach used in this study was “participatory econometrics”. The 
participatory econometric approach accommodated certain steps in sequence: (1) in-depth 
interviews to obtain a grounded understanding of the PES issue; (2) survey instruments based 
on understandings developed from the interviews and field visits; (3)  hypotheses derived 
from qualitative work that was then tested using survey data.  
6 
 
  Thus, there are variety sources of data for this study: (1) documents: legal documents, 
reports, and contracts between the PES intermediary agency (IMP) and farmers' groups; (2) 
maps, (3) interviews; (4) surveys. These data were collected through conducting two rounds 
of fieldwork in West Lombok. The first fieldwork was carried out in May–June 2014, and a 
second fieldwork period in January – May 2015. The first fieldwork aimed to generate deep 
information related to PES development and practice; the second fieldwork aimed to clarify 
the results from the first stage as well as to generate data from the survey and further 
observation. This multiple data collection technique allowed the researcher to perform 
triangulation (Burns, 1997) to cross check, compare and contrast data among several different 
sources. 
Personal semi-structured interviews were conducted in the first stage of fieldwork 
with 22 different informants including PES initiators, a water services officer, forest service 
agency officers, a regional development plan agency officer, a regional environmental sector 
officer, a local council, NGOs activists, academics, the PES program management (IMP) 
officers and local community leaders. In addition to the interviews, a focus group discussion 
was conducted with IMP officers to obtain broader information about their experience in 
managing the PES scheme. Field visits to the villages were also conducted to obtain 
grounded information about PES practice in the field.  
The results from the first fieldwork stage were then used to develop a survey 
instrument (questionnaire). These surveys were conducted during the second period of 
fieldwork by visiting six villages where PES funds were distributed. The surveys aimed to 
elaborate forest farmer experience on PES practice in their community forest area including 
the impact of PES on the economy in the villages.  
Respondents for the surveys were 200 forest farmer households that were selected 
using a purposive random sampling technique (Bryman, 2015). All respondents were 
classified into two difference groups. The first group consisted of 100 households that were 
randomly selected from those who were already enrolled in the PES program. The second 
group consisted of another 100 households that were selected from those who are not enrolled 
in the PES program. This technique was used to generate comparable data among 
respondents in relation to their experience with the PES program. Every survey question in 
the survey related to PES practice was closed and paired with an open-ended question in 
order to generate qualitative data to support the quantitative response.  A focus group 
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discussion (FGD) with community forest leaders was also performed in the second fieldwork. 
In addition, the researcher obtained an opportunity to attend a community forest farmer group 
(CFFG) meeting and workshop on PES related issues, which was organized by a local NGO. 
 
3. Discussion 
3.1.Coasean and Pigouvian approach to Payment for Ecosystem Services  
Coasean economics is the primary conceptual basis of the PES approach (Muradian et 
al., 2010; Sattler & Matzdorf, 2013). The Coasean theorem is based on the assumption that 
the problem of externalities can be solved through direct negotiation among related parties 
who cause and/or are affected by the externality, regardless of the allocation of property 
rights (Coase, 1960; Engel et al., 2008; Sattler & Matzdorf, 2013). In his influential article 
“The Problem of Social Cost”, Coase (1960) challenged Pigou’s approach in “The 
Economics of Welfare”  to solving the problem of externalities.  
Pigou (1932)  argued that negative externality generates a social cost that should be 
dealt with by government. He proposed a system of tax, which is well known as “Pigovian 
tax”, for resolving the social cost problem. Pigou’s solution implies market failure and asserts 
that government authority is needed to correct the market so that an appropriate level of 
compensation for externalities would emerge (Yandle, 1997). Yandle (1997) argue that the 
Pigovian approach is likely to be more appropriate, and is to be applied in large-scale cases, 
where there are a lot of parties included in the system, and where it is too difficult to rely on 
contracts and market solutions. 
On the other hand, instead of taxing or subsidizing the parties who cause externalities 
- to reduce or stop their harmful activity - Coasean economics suggests market and quasi-
market transactions can achieve a socially optimal level of environmental externalities.  
Coase argued that those who produce externalities and those who suffer from them should be 
left in an unregulated situation without government intervention (such as Pigovian taxes or 
subsidies) and that a transaction process will eventually be developed automatically 
regardless of who holds the property rights (Turner, 1994). However, Sattler and Matzdorf 
(2013) argue that in practice, the Coasean solution faces some obstacles regarding efficient 
bargaining, in particular, high transaction costs, power imbalances, and poorly defined 
property rights. Thus the Coasean solution itself required a clear definition and allocation of 
property rights (guaranteed ownership of resources via the force of state law) and low 
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transaction costs, similarly requiring state intervention (Turner, 1994; Muradian et al., 2010). 
Table 1 summaries PES practices in some countries that based on Coasean and Pigouvian 
approach. 
 
Table 1. Summary of PES Schemes 
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In summary, in a Coasean style PES, the beneficiaries of environmental services make 
a direct payment to the environmental services provider based on a mutually agreed voluntary 
negotiated procedure. By contrast, in a Pigovian style PES, the government undertakes an 
intervention such as by providing a subsidy to pay the environmental services provider in 
order to secure the environmental services provision (Sattler & Matzdorf, 2013). It is possible 
that a hybrid Coasean and Pigovian approach can lead to a new policy paradigm that 
combines elements of both a voluntary market-based and mandatory policy-based system. An 
example of the hybrid approach is the PSA program in Costa Rica considering the source of 
fund that combines Pigouvian and Coasean approach. The funding for this program comes 
from a private hydroelectric producer, tax, and the World Bank loans (Sánchez-Azofeifa & 
Pfaff, 2007). The PES system in West Lombok Indonesia is also a hybrid approach that is 
combining voluntary transaction in the supply side and government regulation in the demand 
side. 
Pirard (2012) argues that PES in West Lombok is atypical compared to standard PES 
practices elsewhere with respect to the method of payment and the extent of compulsory 
public participation (Pirard, 2012, p. 28). Unlike other PES practices, the PES program in 
West Lombok has been officially mandated through a local government regulation, which is 
in line with Pigouvian approach. According to the regulation, anyone who utilizes the 
specified ecosystem services is obliged to pay a PES levy. This compulsory approach cannot 
meet the voluntary transaction criteria of PES that is proposed by Wunder (2005)2 that has 
been a mainstream assumption of the PES literature. A new expanded concept of PES  is 
required to encompass mandatory PES approaches that employ public policy in their 
implementation (Pirard, 2012). In this hybrid PES approach, Pigouvian approach is used in 
demand side to enforce mandatory participation from water consumers to pay for the PES 
                                                            
2 Wunder (2005, p. 9) uses five criteria to describe PES principles: “A PES is: (1) a voluntary transaction where 
(2) a well-defined environmental service (3) is being ‘bought’ by a (minimum one) environmental services 
buyer (4) from a (minimum one) environmental services provider (5) if and only if the environmental services 
provider secures the environmental services provision (conditionality).”   
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levy. Meanwhile, on the supply side, Coasean approach is used to encourage voluntary 
participation from forest farmers to enrol into the PES program.  
 
3.2.The PES Program introduction in West Lombok 
The PES program was introduced as a response to the threat of water shortages in 
Lombok. The economic disparity between communities who managed forests in rural areas 
and those who consume water in urban areas evokes a conflict of interest related to forest 
governance. The poor villagers who live in areas surrounding Rinjani forest are encouraged 
to take part in the protection of the forest, which conflicts with their economic dependence on 
forest land. Meanwhile, the relatively prosperous communities in urban areas need water and 
are thus dependent on effective governance of the forest. The provincial government of West 
Nusa Tenggara could address the conflict of interest by implementing a conservation program 
which includes empowerment and livelihood benefits for villagers for a ‘win-win’ solution 
for both parties. This is, however, beyond the fiscal capacity of the local government.  
Limited government budgets for forest conservation motivated several NGOs and academics 
in Lombok to propose a scheme which encourages urban water consumers to participate in 
collective contributions for funding the conservation of water catchment areas through a PES 
program (RH, NGO officer, and PB, academic, interview, 6/6/2014, and 7/6/2014). 
The ecosystem services concept was initially introduced in 2004 in urban areas. At the 
same time, institutional strengthening of rural communities through community organizing 
and capacity building was also conducted. Furthermore, widespread dissemination of 
information on ecosystem service initiatives was organized, locally and nationally.  
Following this, a trial of PES collection from tap water consumers (PDAM consumers) in 
East Mataram, a sub-district in the city of Mataram, was carried out and achieved positive 
responses from the participants (IMP, FGD, 4/6/2014).  
Due to the complexities and scale of the water conservation issue, a mandatory PES 
scheme was proposed that is enforced through local government regulation. This is to ensure 
that all water consumers contribute to the PES program. The West Lombok Regional 
Government Regulation (Peraturan Daerah, Perda) number 4/2007 was enacted in 2007 as 
the fundamental basis of the official PES program. This policy regulates the scheme of 
payment for any individual and commercial use of water resources. The payment will be used 
for forest protection especially for the conservation of the water catchment area. This type of 
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PES practice is similar to PES practice in Vietnam (Suhardiman et al., 2013) that also driven 
by government regulation and intervention which is in-line with the Pigouvian approach.  
Two years after the Perda 4/2007 was enacted, it had still not been implemented, 
however. Although the program received positive responses when a trial was firstly 
introduced, resistance arose from some parties who argued that people should not have to pay 
for the provision of ecosystem services. To address this problem, advocacy was carried out 
through the PDAM consumers’ association as the representative of all water consumers. 
Water consumers were educated about the importance of forests for maintaining a sustainable 
water supply. To avoid more resistance from the water consumers, water quantity and quality 
were enhanced by developing a new source for water extraction. This effort was conducted in 
order to demonstrate that a sustainable water supply is the result of good forest governance 
(SA, forestry agency officer, interview, 7/6/2014). To encourage a better awareness of people 
on the importance of PES development, campaigns on PES were mounted through various 
media, as well as through discussion forums. The Perda 4/2007 was finally implemented in 
2009, four years after the PES scheme was introduced.   
3.3.A multi-stakeholder entity to manage PES 
Since it is difficult to equalize the interests of heterogeneous sellers and buyers of 
ecosystem services in the case of PES program in West Lombok, a trusted independent body 
that takes a role as mediator and manager of the PES scheme is needed to oversee the 
program. One key success of PES programs in several countries, among other things, is the 
involvement of intermediaries (Vatn, 2010; Sattler et al., 2013). As argued by Huber-Stearns 
et al. (2013), such an intermediary body is necessary for effective PES application. 
Intermediary bodies play significant roles as agents of information exchange among related 
stakeholders, program designers, through representation and mediation among buyers, sellers 
and other participants, as well as providing administration and project coordination (Huber-
Stearns et al., 2013). They also may act to control, monitor and verify the ecosystem services 
delivery (Sattler et al., 2013).  
In Lombok an entity called Institusi Multi Pihak (IMP) was formed (WK, member of 
IMP, interview, 11/6/2014) to act as intermediary. The IMP is officially working in 
coordination with the West Lombok government that established the entity. The West 
Lombok Regent’s decree (Keputusan Bupati number 1072/207/Dishut/2009) appointed the 
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IMP as an independent entity to manage the PES program.  The IMP consists of 
representatives from relevant government departments, business, civil society, NGOs, 
academics and the PDAM consumers association, who are chosen by the Regent based on 
their experience and strategic positions.  
Many challenges are faced by the IMP in managing the PES program. The most 
significant one is to obtain public trust in relation to fund management (WK, member of IMP, 
FGD, 4/6/2014). To achieve public trust on the demand side among consumers, efforts have 
been undertaken including a massive campaign through mass media and direct meetings with 
communities. To maintain accountability, an annual audited financial report is published in 
the local media. On the supply side, IMP also has to be able to advocate upstream 
communities that the PES payment is supposed to be used for forest and watershed 
conservation. In this regard, participatory monitoring and evaluation in upstream areas are 
done to ensure that PES terms and conditions have been followed. 
3.4.Unfairness of the ecosystem service price 
Setting up a system to collect the payments was a challenge for the introduction of the 
PES scheme in West Lombok. Fauzi and Anna (2013) argue that fiscal regulations for water 
charges in Indonesia are conflicting. Indonesian law no 28/2009 stated that government is 
able to charge for surface water and deep water. On the other hand, law no 7/2004 regulates 
that water used for basic needs and agricultural purposes is free of charge (Fauzi & Anna, 
2013). There are two official schemes for collecting money from the public in Indonesia - 
through tax and levy - the levy scheme was chosen for PES payment in West Lombok and the 
tap water company (PDAM) company was appointed to act as the collector of the payment.  
The rate of payment that is collected from water users was designed to be a flat fee 
across all households. Every household pays Rp 1,000 (equal to about US$ 0.08) per month 
regardless of their water consumption. Thus, there is no distinction between the rich and the 
poor; all consumers pay the same amount regardless of their economic condition. This 
situation contrast from the criteria of fairness since people who consume high volumes of 
water are paying the same as those who consume less, and neither need nor disincentives to 
waste were central considerations in designing the scheme. The purpose of this flat rate is to 
simplify the scheme and to reduce the resistance from all water users (PB, academics, 
interview, 7/6/2014). In addition, the initial aim of the program was to build awareness 
among urban consumers about the necessity for forest protection. It is possible, however, to 
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increase the rate in the future once this program is well established (WK, a member of IMP, 
FGD, 4/6/2014).  
 Under this PES scheme, industries pay double the rate of households regardless of 
how much water they use. This situation also seems inequitable, since big industries such as 
hotels that use a lot of water are paying the same amount as small shops, and are paying little 
more than household consumers. The application of the PES would be more efficient if the 
amount charged was determined in accordance with the volume of water used, according to 
an academic (PB, academic, interview, 7/6/2014). Ninety-four percent of the total water 
supply from PDAM is consumed by households, while industries only consumed six percent 
(PDAM Giri Menang, 2014). Instead of using water from PDAM, the vast majority of 
industries in Lombok extract water directly from underground water sources. Despite the fact 
that underground water provision is also influenced by the existence of forests on the island, 
industries refuse to pay the PES levy due to an underground water extraction tax that has 
been charged by the local government.  
 
3.5.Integrating PES and Community Forestry Program 
Since the PES program was designed to conserve the forest as well as to reduce 
poverty, an alternative way to achieve this goal is by integrating PES into community forestry 
practice. Thus, the Community Forest Farmer Groups (CFFGs) who manage the forest in the 
water catchment area are identified as the ecosystem service providers. The application of the 
PES was then adapted to suit the community forestry practice. In practicing community 
forestry, CFFGs plant multipurpose trees species (MPTS), trees that are able to produce 
economic and ecological benefit in their lifetime, for example, durian, mangosteen and 
candlenut. The PES payment is then used for funding MPTS and timber tree planting at the 
community forestry location. Such in-kind payment that suits the needs of forest farmers 
tends to be accepted more easily and could stimulate more participation, as experienced in 
Western Mexico (Balderas Torres et al., 2013). 
The Coasean approach works on the supply side, allowing voluntary transaction 
mechanism occurs between IMP and CFFGs. The PES program gained positive responses 
from CFFGs although the current PES funding is only sufficient to cover the costs of 
conservation activities. Based on interviews with farmers, they cannot afford to buy seeds to 
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be planted on community forest land, which is debatable since the price of seed is only 2.5% 
of their income (survey data, 2015). The PES program that over free seed is easily accepted 
by the CFFGs. Since the amount of available funds provided is limited, the CFFGs compete 
to enroll to the PES program and not all CFFGs can be involved.  Some of them have to wait 
their turn until the PES fund is enough to fund their PES proposal. 
 
4. Result 
4.1. Farmers Opinions on the Contribution of PES on Poverty Alleviation 
The PES program in West Lombok is integrated with community forestry in order to 
help farmers obtain free seeds, which is mainly MPTS that are supposed to provide economic 
benefit and thus contribute to poverty reduction. However, since the amount of funds 
provided is relatively small, it can only be used for additional capital for managing the 
community forest. Nonetheless, Fauzi and Anna (2013) argue that PES has been readily 
accepted by local people since it adopts a policy that is very different from the command and 
control system of natural resources management that previously applied under Indonesia's 
New Order regime.  
It is difficult to argue that PES will be able to solve poverty problems in the short 
term. Since most of the planted trees are categorized as MPTS, it can be assumed that more 
benefits will be enjoyed in the long term once they are ready to be harvested (RN, personal 
communication, 10 June 2014). My survey results indicate that 64% of respondents think that 
PES improves a farmer family’s quality of life. There is a possibility that their incomes will 
increase in the future once the seeds that have been bought from the PES fund, which are 
MPTS, have grown and produce fruits that may serve as a source of income (RN, community 
leader, interview, 10/6/2014). They do not get paid for planting the trees since their CFFG 
agreed to allocate the planting wage for buying more seeds so that more trees can be planted 
and more future economic benefits could be achieved.  On the other hand, 18% of 
respondents disagree that PES improves their family’s quality of life. The main reason is that 
the trees are not fully grown and have not yet produced yields. Furthermore, they explained 
that the number of seeds is limited and not adequate for their needs. Furthermore, not all 
forest farmers are involved in the PES program due to the limited budget as mentioned above. 
Others have just started to become involved in the PES program, and except for free seeds, 
have not yet obtained a direct economic benefit.  
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The survey indicates that around 17% of respondents are neutral, which means they 
neither agree nor disagree with the statement that PES improves their family’s quality of life. 
The main reason as among those who disagree is because the seeds have not yet grown. The 
economic benefit may be achieved in the future if the seeds grow well. There is an 
expectation that the PES program may reduce poverty in the future. About 83% of 
respondents indicated that PES could potentially support poverty alleviation after all forest 
farmers get involved and all the seeds have grown and are producing fruits. In such a 
situation, money from PES can be used for other economic activities rather than for forest 
conservation once the forest has been fully planted.  However, for the time being, the current 
direct economic benefit from PES is the value of the seeds that are distributed. If the farmers 
have to buy the seeds using their own money, they need to spend at least Rp 11,600 (US$ 
0.87) per seed on average. The money from PES would be more beneficial if it could also be 
used for planting wages.  
Ironically, PES funds, which are supposed to be used for conservation related 
activities, are also used as a source of revenue for the local government. As stipulated in 
Perda 4/2007, a quarter of the PES fund is allocated for regional government revenue and 
three-quarters of the collected funds are allocated to activities related to ecosystem services 
provisions, such as forest conservation or local people’s economic empowerment initiatives. 
On the other hand, a large number of CFFGs that are potential participants in the PES scheme 
are still on a waiting list since only around ten CFFGs can be involved in any one year. This 
is similar to PES practice in Vietnam, where the scheme is also used as a government revenue 
source (Suhardiman et al., 2013). However, the type of ecosystem services in Vietnam’s PES 
program are not clearly defined (Suhardiman et al., 2013) in contrast with the PES program 
in West Lombok.  
 
4.2.Econometrics Model for Poverty Alleviation 
An econometrics model was developed to support the qualitative findings of this 
study. This model particularly aims to estimate the impact of the hybrid PES program on 
poverty alleviation. The welfare of the forest farmers that manage the community forestry is 
considered as a proxy for poverty condition.  The welfare variable is a composite variable 
constructed from seven components which are the physical living standards of the forest 
farmer that defined by Indonesian statistics agency (Riyadi et al., 2015). Indonesia Statistics 
Agency (BPS) publishes yearly welfare indicators to report the economic condition of the 
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Indonesian households. The data was collected through surveys including national social 
economic survey and national workforce survey. The publication reports several measurable 
aspects of human welfares including health and nutrition, education, employment, 
consumption level and patterns, housing and environment, poverty, and other social aspects 
(Riyadi et al., 2015).  
Following the Indonesian Welfare Indicator, this study considers seven aspects to 
measure the welfare condition of the forest farmers in Sesaot community forest. These 
aspects including house ownership, house condition, electricity supply, water supply, energy 
for cooking, transportation facility and telecommunication facility. All aspects’ score were 
thus compounded into a single number as a welfare index variable, using weighted average 
method  (Nardo et al., 2005).  
Welfare of community forest farmer was hypothesized to be influenced by 
community forestry index, property rights of the forest farmer upon the community forest, 
farmer involvement on PES program, farmer obedience on adat rule to govern the 
community forest, and community forest land size. Thus, the econometric model for this 
situation is as follow: 
 
welfare = β0 + β1 cfind + β2pr + β3 pes+ β4 adat + β5lgcfland + ε                       (1) 
 
The dependent variable in this model is welfare growth. This variable measures the 
growth of the forest farmer’s welfare in two periods of time, before community forestry 
program was introduced in 1998 and after the program has been well established in 2015. 
Five independent variables are considered to influence the welfare growth. These are 
community forestry index (cfind), property rights (pr), farmer involvement status in PES 
program (pes), farmer obedience on adat rule (adat) and community forest land size 
(lgcfland).  
Expected influence of each independent variable on the dependent variable in this 
model is as follow. 
1. Influence of community forest index on welfare 
Community forestry index refers to an index of community forestry management 
practice that applied by the forest farmer. This index is constructed from nine factors 
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that form three groups of governance indicators of community forestry. The factors 
including land governance, institutional governance, and business governance. A high 
index indicates a better community forestry practice that will possibly lead to a better 
economic outcome, thus a higher welfare growth. 
2. Influence of property rights on welfare 
Property rights of the farmer, which is indicated by the legal status of the community 
forestry land, will assure the security of land access for the farmer. It is likely that the 
more secure the access, the more confidence the farmer in managing the land, and it 
will thus produce a better outcome for their income and economic livelihood. A more 
secure the property rights could impact on a better outcome and thus produce a higher 
welfare growth.  
3. Influence of PES on welfare 
Farmer involvement in PES program will generate an economic benefit since PES 
program provides cash that is used by the farmers’ group to buy MPTS seeds to be 
planted in the community forest land. The value of the seeds could be an immediate 
economic benefit of the PES program. Furthermore, the fruit produced by the MPTS 
is the most economic benefit for the farmer in the future. Thus, involvement in PES 
program is estimated to increase the welfare growth. 
4. Influence of adat on welfare 
Adat rule is a local customary law that is agreed and used by the CFFGs in 
community forestry management.  Failure to follow the adat rule will cause the forest 
farmer lost their rights to manage the community forest. Thus, they will suffer an 
economic loss since income from community forest will be lost as well. Following the 
adat rule will ensure the safety of the rights, thus ensuring their economic benefit 
from the community forest. It is hypothesized that the higher the adat obedience, the 
higher the welfare growth.  
5. Influence of community forestry land size on welfare 
Community forestry land size was estimated to influence welfare growth in regard to 
the ability of the households to obtain money by farming on the community forestry 
land. It was assumed that the larger the land size, the more money the household can 
obtain, thus the higher the welfare growth. 
The estimation result of the OLS regression for this model is as follow. 
welfare = β0 + β1cfind+ β2pr + β3 pes+ β4adat + β5lgcfland + ε                                    (1)         
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	23.516 2.112 15.098 1.248 2.753 12.618   
                   (2.59)**       (1.37)           (6.22)***         (0.59)            (1.55)             (2.98)** 
F = 12.21*** 
Adj R2 = 0.2198 
 
Numbers in the bracket is t statistics 
*     significant at α 10% 
**   significant at α 5% 
*** significant at α 1% 
 
The estimation for model 1 resulting only two independent variables, property right 
and community forestland size, that significantly influences the welfare with confident 
interval 99% and 95% respectively. Meanwhile, PES and adat does not significantly 
influence the welfare. This model produces F statistic 12.21 which indicates a significant 
influence of all independent variables simultaneously to welfare by 99% of confidence 
interval. This model can to explain the variation of welfare by 21.98% which is indicated by 
the adjusted R2 value of the model. 
The next regression removes the PES variable since it has the smallest probability to 
influence the welfare. It thus produces model 2.  
welfare = β0 + β1cfind+ β2pr, + β3adat + β4lgcfland + ε                                         (2)         
The regression result for the model 2 is as follow. 
	23.864 2.108 15.510 2.813 12.856   
                   (2.63)**       (1.37)           (6.70)***         (1.59)         (2.63)** 
F = 15.22*** 
Adj R2 = 0.2223 
 
Numbers in the bracket is t statistics 
*     significant at α 10% 
**   significant at α 5% 
*** significant at α 1% 
 
After PES variable has been removed that resulting model 2, the community forestry 
index and adat remain insignificant to influence the welfare. Meanwhile, the property right 
and community forest land size still significantly influence the welfare with confident interval 
99% and 95% respectively. Removing PES variable has increased the F statistic and the 
adjusted R2.   
This econometrics analysis indicates that PES program has not influenced the 
farmers’ welfare, and thus poverty alleviation. It is an interesting finding since this condition 
contradicts with the PES theory and the PES program’s goal.  
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5. Conclusion  
Payment for ecosystem services (PES) is one important policy framework aimed at 
controlling externalities in a management of common resources such as forests. Pigou’s and 
Coase’s theories became the fundamental alternative approaches for PES development and 
implementation. The Coasean approach is featuring market transactions between the party 
which cause the negative externality and the environmental service user who suffers from it. 
Coase suggests that both parties negotiate without any government intervention so that an 
optimal level of balance can be achieved between cost and reward. On the other hand, the 
Pigouvian approach accommodates the involvement of government in mitigating the 
externalities through regulatory mechanisms, and by exercising tax or subsidy authorities. In 
practice, many applications of PES follow the Pigouvian approach where the buyer of the 
ecosystem services is the government, or the government provides cash on behalf of their 
citizens for rewarding the resource protection. Others PES practice employ the Coasean 
approach where the ecosystem services buyers are private companies or communities who 
voluntary transact with the ecosystem services providers. There is also a possibility for a 
hybrid PES system that compounds Coasean and Pigouvian approach, where market 
transactions are involved, and government intervenes through policy frameworks to make the 
PES system work.  
The PES program that has been applied in West Lombok is an example of hybrid PES 
system that has been integrated with the community forestry management program. The PES 
program provides funding for planting trees in the degraded community forest in order to 
maintain water supplies from the forest. The hybrid PES system is designed to achieve forest 
conservation and poverty reduction in the rural area where ecosystem services (water) is 
produced. On the supply side, Coasean theory works where forest farmers tend to accept the 
PES program since there is an expectation for future economic benefit from planting MPTS 
trees that were funded from the PES program. On the demand side, Pigouvian theory works 
where local government intervenes through a regional regulation to enforce urban water 
consumers to participate in providing the PES fund. 
This study argues that the hybrid PES program in West Lombok does not contribute 
to poverty alleviation in short term. It might be beneficial for poverty alleviation in the long 
term once the economic benefit from the seeds that bought using PES fund grow and produce 
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